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Abstract 
Students’ choices about post-secondary fields of study vary widely across space and time, due to 
many psychological, social and economic motivations. Regarding these latter, the most important 
role in steering students’ options has been often ascribed to expected returns from different 
occupations. This paper emphasizes in particular the link between local institutional quality, the 
reward structure and students’ preferences. Based on a sample of 80,996 students graduated in Italy 
in 2004 and 2007, our econometric investigation, controlling for both individual characteristics 
(gender, residence, family background, high school track) and geographical variables (per capita 
GDP, industrial specialization), finds that in the choice of the field of study institutional quality 
definitely matters. 
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1. Introduction  
Students’ choices about post-secondary fields of study vary widely across space and time. 
According to UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2014), in 2011-2012 within European Union, the 
share of graduates in engineering ranged between 8.4% of Malta to 20.1% of Finland, while those 
obtaining a degree in law, social sciences or business were just 23.4% of total graduates in Germany 
but more than 54% in Bulgaria and Romania. Similar differences can be found elsewhere as well:  
in America in the same years, the proportion of graduates in law, social sciences or business largely 
varied between Cuba (24.2%) and Chile (29.4%) on one side, and Brazil (41.0%) and Colombia 
(48.5%) on the other. Concerning differences over time, the same source reports that between 1999-
2000 and 2011-12 the share of graduated in law, social sciences or business has undergone 
substantial increases in many advanced countries, with an average rise of about 4 percentage points 
and a growth of 9.3% in Australia. Even more notably, with reference to a large sample of US 
students, Goldin and Katz (2008) show that the shares of those completing medical and business 
school respectively decreased by 19% and increased by 111% between 1972 and 1992.     
The reasons behind this wide heterogeneity in students’ preferences have been long 
investigated. To justify so divergent attitudes and ample discrepancies among different countries 
and times, many psychological, social and economic motivations (some of which are recalled below 
in the review of Section 2) have been set forth. Regarding in particular economic drives, the most 
important role in steering students’ options has been often ascribed to expected returns from 
different occupations, while a number of contributions have focused on other microeconomic 
aspects of the choice (individual ability and tastes, the cost of education, the presence of financial 
constraints, etc.). On the other hand, it has been also recognized that often macroeconomic 
structural factors matter as well: for example, productive specialization, technology, markets’ 
competition and institutional factors have been deemed to be relevant in driving students’ 
preferences, to the extent that they affect the reward structure and shape differences in careers’ 
relative expected profitability. 
3 
 
This paper adopts an approach emphasizing in particular the link between local institutional 
quality, the reward structure and students’ preferences. As recalled at length in Section 2, a wide 
literature has argued that bad institutions encourage rent-seeking, thus pushing talent toward either 
occupations meant to defend from rent-seeking behaviors (mainly legal and socio-political 
professions) or rent-seeking activities themselves. Conversely, when institutions are strong, careers 
devoted to shelter from rent-seeking are less needed and less profitable: less needed because a 
smaller share of production is at stake, and less profitable because rent-seeking is less successful 
(Acemoglu, 1995). Building on several previous studies, we consider choices for science, 
engineering and economics degrees or alternatively for law or socio-political studies respectively as 
proxies for an option for productive activities or alternatively in favour of rent-seeking (or 
protection from rent-seeking). This latter choice has to be seen merely as a rational response to 
relatively high rewards for legal and socio-political professions supplied by a context of poor 
institutional quality, so that obviously no negative moral judgment is involved. 
Addressing the issue of the choice of post-secondary education in Italy has a strong 
motivation in the evidence of pretty large differences in students’ preferences among different 
regions in the country. For example, according to the representative sample of ISTAT (2009; 2013), 
that we use in this paper, the share of students graduated in Business, Science (including 
Chemistry), Engineering and Architecture is around 39% in the North-Western (Lombardy, 
Piedmont, Liguria and Valle d’Aosta), and North-Eastern (Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Trentino Alto 
Adige and Friuli Venezia Giulia) regions, 34% in the regions of the Centre (Toscana, Lazio, Marche 
and Umbria) and 33% in the South (Abruzzo, Campania, Apulia, Molise, Basilicata, Calabria, 
Sicily and Sardinia). Conversely, students of Law and Socio-political disciplines account 
respectively for 15% in the North-West, 14% in the North-East, 17% in the Centre and almost 20% 
in the South. More recent data made available by Almalaurea (2013), collecting data on graduates 
of 64 (out of 85) Italian universities, confirm the extent of differences: degrees in Science, 
Engineering, Architecture and Business account for 40.7% of total graduates in the North,  but only 
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for 35.2% in the South, whereas degrees in law and socio-political studies are obtained by less than 
15% of students in the North versus more than 19% in the Southern regions. 
Explaining large differences at a sub-national is especially puzzling, considering that, at 
least in developed countries, economic conditions, production structures and career rewards are 
usually quite homogeneous across regions. In the case of Italy however the evidence of significant 
diversity in students’ preferences is less surprising, in the light of the large disparities occurring in a 
number of economic and social indicators across different regions of the country (Malanima e 
Zamagni, 2010; Giannola et al., 2015) which testify the multifaceted nature of the Southern lag. In 
particular, this paper focuses on the heterogeneity in the institutional quality of Italian regions as a 
possible determinant of students’ choices on post-secondary fields of study. To this purpose, the 
Institutional Quality Index (IQI) constructed by Nifo and Vecchione (2014) is employed. IQI 
evaluates local institutional quality for Italian regions and provinces as a synthetic indicator derived 
by 24 elementary indexes grouped into five categories (voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption), in the fashion of the World Governance 
Indicator (WGI) proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2010).  
The econometric investigation is conducted on a sample of 47,300 students graduated in 
Italy in 2004. Estimation methods are Probit, Logit and Multinomial Logit models. Given the 
hierarchical nature of data, for robustness purposes, estimation is also made through a multilevel 
analysis considering both individuals (at a lower level) and regions as aggregate units at a higher 
level. Our findings are definitely robust and basically confirm the hypothesis that local institutional 
quality plays a significant role in determining students’ choice. As a matter of fact, once controlled 
for students’ individual characteristics (gender, family conditions, migratory status, secondary 
school attainments), the reputation of different universities for each field of study, the economic 
condition of students’ province of origin (per-capita GDP and industrial intensity), we find that 
institutional quality is relevant to the choice of the field of study, with relatively high marginal 
effects. This outcome holds in particular for the “Rule of law” sub-index, emphasizing that 
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institutional contexts characterised by a relatively high incidence of crime, poor law enforcement 
and low effectiveness in the administration of justice spur a higher demand for protection from rent-
seeking and make it more profitable to acquire education in the fields of law and social and political 
studies. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 provides a short review of the literature on the issue. 
Section 3 is devoted to the econometric investigation. In particular, in Section 3.1 estimation 
strategy, methods, and explanatory variables are presented; in Section 3.2 the dataset and some 
descriptive statistics are shown; Section 3.3 displays results and comments on them. The main 
conclusions of the paper are collected in Section 4. 
 
2. Related literature 
The choice of the post-secondary field of study has drawn considerable attention by economists 
through time and given rise to a large number of both theoretical and empirical papers. This 
literature can be considered as a segment of the much wider literature flourished on human capital 
and the decision to invest in education since the seminal work of Becker (1964), just like the issue 
of selecting the field of study for a given education level (i.e., the educational horizontal choice) 
may be seen as an aspect of a more general option about the amount of education to acquire (i.e. the 
vertical choice among primary, secondary or post-secondary education).  
The specific literature on the choice of the field of study has developed by adopting at least 
three possible different approaches. The prevailing line of research has privileged a mostly 
empirical microeconomic viewpoint, by focusing on expected future earnings and returns to 
education as the key variables in shaping students’ options (Kirkebøen et al., 2014; Beffy et al., 
2012; Boudarbat, 2008; Berger, 1988). In a nutshell, according to this approach, different 
occupations offer very different payoffs, and individuals tend to choose careers in which they have 
comparative and absolute advantage. Of course, even this perspective does not deny that many other 
variables may be relevant to the choice (Wiswall and Zafar, 2015; Fiorito and Dauffenbach, 1982). 
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Indeed, selecting the field of study for a given education level is much more complex than simply 
determining the number of years of education, and this choice may be reasonably affected by a 
number of non strictly economic factors. As Altonji et al. (2011) point out, beside the purely 
financial returns to education, which include expected wages, net tuition costs, and the discount 
rate, the students’ choices also “depend on ability, the prior stock of knowledge, and tastes for 
education”. In addition, individual risk aversion matters for several reasons, for “individuals care 
about uncertainty in ability and the effect of this uncertainty on alternative degrees or courses of 
study, possibly avoiding ones where ability might matter a lot”, and also because of “the possible 
volatility of returns to education (…) and the microeconomic uncertainty in wages within each 
sector”. 
However, as the dominant approach does not seem to fully account for all possible 
psychological and social motivations behind preferences for different types of education, another 
strand of the literature, building on the seminal work of Akerlof and Kranton (2002), emphasize the 
concept of social identity as a major determinant in the choice of careers and fields of education. In 
this view, purely economic factors like expected net economic rewards are little suitable to explain 
why highly able individuals choose so frequently high-skilled low-paid occupations. According to 
Humlum et al. (2012) “individuals (…) think of themselves and others in terms of social categories. 
In addition to the standard pecuniary payoff, the utility function incorporates a non-pecuniary 
payoff associated with a person’s identity, which depends on the agent’s choice of social category 
and on how well the agent’s characteristics and actions correspond to the ideal of that social 
category”. Careers and fields of study are therefore somehow connected to the type of identity that 
each student assigns to herself or himself: so, individualistic doers, like for example most of 
“nerds”, are more incline to studies like Business, Law and Economics, while characters associated 
to a more social identity would rather propend for Teaching, Humanities and Arts. This setting 
shows to be particularly fruitful in interpreting gender differences in access to careers and fields of 
study and explaining why, even in the most advanced countries, women “remain substantially under 
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represented across a range of technical and scientific fields” (Rosenbloom et al., 2008). Also, other 
personal and social features such as marital status, race and the family cultural background are 
found to matter significantly in students’ choice of the field of studies (Montmarquette et al., 2002; 
Boudarbat and Montmarquette, 2009). 
While both these approaches focus on individual determinants of the choice of the field of 
study, neither of them explicitly considers how the macroeconomic environment (for example, 
technological structure, wealth distribution, institutional quality) might affect that choice. 
Conversely, the impact of these latter factors on returns to different types of education and the 
profitability of different occupations has been investigated by another strand of the literature. For 
example, Banerjee and Newman (1993) show the interplay between agents’ occupational decisions, 
production technology and the distribution of wealth; Acemoglu (1995) argues that the reward 
structure of entrepreneurial careers and rent seeking activities depends on technological factors as 
well as the extent of the negative externalities exerted by rent seeking on productive activities; in 
the same vein, Mehlum et al. (2003) claim that at low levels of development, predation is often 
more attractive than at higher levels of development, so that a larger share of agents prefers to be 
engaged in criminal rather than productive activities, thus pushing the economy in a vicious cycle of 
poverty and predation.  
Concerning specifically institutions, the role of well defined property rights, little 
corruption, definite and secure rule of law is documented by a broad literature, according to which 
institutional quality exerts an impact on both the accumulation of human capital and the choice of 
the kind of education. A positive association between institutional quality and human capital 
accumulation is found for example by Pecorino (1992) and Hall and Jones (1999). According to  
Pritchett (2006), the effect of institutions on the investments in human capital is more qualitative 
than quantitative, as they shape the structure of rewards and affect the choice of careers, thus 
determining how really beneficial is human capital for growth. The idea that different institutions 
supply different individual incentives relevant to the choice of the field of study is also developed 
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by Natkhov and Polishchuk (2013), who directly connect institutional quality to the choice of 
college majors in Poland and Ukraine. Building on the evidence of large differences in the shares of 
students pursuing degrees in science and technology or in legal studies, these authors argue that 
those differences reflect the uneven quality of institutions in the two countries: “Stronger 
institutions make young Poles confident in the ability to earn good rates of returns to their skills, 
knowledge, and innovations in modern technologies, whereas young Ukrainians believe that law 
degrees would better equip them for an institutional environment where the rule of law is feeble and 
corruption and rent-seeking reign supreme”. 
Treating a degree in science or engineering as a proxy for the choice of an occupation in 
productive activities, and instead an option in favour of a career in legal studies as a preference for 
activities of (protection from) rent-seeking dates back at least to Tollison (1982) and has been 
widely employed in the literature. Magee et al. (1989) and Murphy et al. (1991) are among the first 
to use the number of lawyers or the relative college enrolment rates in law and in engineering in a 
growth equation as proxies for the society attitude to rent-seeking or productive entrepreneurship. 
More recently, many others have highlighted on one side the role of good institutions in favoring 
the demand of knowledge and technical abilities and then higher rewards for science and 
engineering careers (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007); on the other the incentive to legal professions 
supplied by a context of poor institutional quality. On this latter point, several contributions have 
clarified that bad institutions underpin the appeal of legal studies not only by increasing chances 
and profitability of rent-seeking but also by raising the demand for protection against rent-seekers 
and other threats associated to poor institutional quality (Arruñada, 2007; Dezalay and Garth,1997; 
Cumming and Johan, 2006)1. Finally, like for legal studies, even the preference for degrees in 
political and social studies may be treated as an indicator of propensity to careers in (protection 
from) rent seeking: indeed many authors, from different viewpoints, have emphasized the role of 
                                                           
1
 Magee (2010) distinguishes between facilitative legal actions (protecting and increasing wealth) and redistributive 
actions bringing about opposite effects. 
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politicians and bureaucrats in rent-seeking activities, intermediation and protection from rent-
seeking, lobbying and bribes (e.g. Krueger, 1974; Mushtaq and Jomo, 2000; Keefer and Knack, 
2007). 
To conclude, we like recalling how the relationship among institutions, the agents’ 
endowment of skills and economic growth is acutely summarized by North (1992): “if the 
institutional framework made the highest pay-offs for organizations piracy, then organizational 
success and survival dictated that learning would take the form of being better pirates. If on the 
other hand productivity raising activities had the highest pay-off then the economy would grow”. In 
the same vein, Murphy et al. (1991) point out that the quality of institutions is decisive in steering 
choices toward productive activities or rent seeking because “Countries with poorly defined 
property rights attract talent into rent seeking, since success at redefining these property rights 
brings high rewards. Rent seeking pays because a lot of wealth is up for grabs”. Some implications 
of this intuition are displayed in Appendix 1 of this paper, where we sketch a simple formal 
framework built on Acemoglu (1995), showing how institutional quality, represented by the share 
of production subject to be seized by rent seekers, may impact on incentives and determine the 
choice among careers in production, rent seeking and protection from rent seeking.  
 
3. The empirical investigation 
This section is devoted to provide evidence about the reasons driving the choice of post-secondary 
field of studies in Italy and in particular to single out the role of local institutional quality in 
determining this choice. To perform this task, we carry out an econometric analysis, where the 
students’ option is the dependent variable. Estimation strategy and methods, and the motivations 
behind our choice of regressors are presented in Section 3.1. The dataset we employ, together with 
some descriptive statistics are illustrated in Section 3.2. Finally, Section 3.3 deals with the 
presentation and discussion of the results of our investigation. 
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3.1. Estimation strategy and methods 
Since the students’ choice about the field of tertiary studies can be clearly seen as a qualitative 
variable, methods eligible for evaluating the role of possible explanatory factors of this choice 
necessarily belong to the family of the limited Dependent Variable models. For this reason, the 
following analysis is conducted by employing Logit and Probit models for binary response, and 
then also a Multinomial Logit model. Consistently, in the case of Logit and Probit estimations, the 
students’ choice is modeled as a binary option between Productive and Defending fields of studies 
and regressors are assumed to impact on the probability that a student makes each choice. In 
accordance with the approach followed by most of the literature on the relationship between 
institutions and human capital accumulation recalled in Section 2, we include studies in Science, 
Chemistry and Pharmacology, Geology, Biology, Engineering, Architecture, Economics and 
Statistics in the group of Productive; the group of Defending is made up of Law and Political and 
social studies; the group of “Other fields of study” comprises Literature, Language, Teaching,  
Psychology, Physical education, Defence and Security. Finally, Medical studies are not included in 
any group because of the peculiar restrictions legally imposed on the number of students enrolled in 
this field of study (numerus clausus), which makes it unsuitable to be used in the econometric 
investigation. 
More precisely, the model we estimate is 
      = 1|
 =  + 
    [1] 
where  is the students’ choice, conventionally assuming the value 1 if a student prefers a 
Productive field of study and 0 in case that a Defending one is chosen; 
 denotes the vector of 
explanatory variables,  are parameters and  is alternatively the logistic function in the Logit 
model and the standard normal cumulative distribution function in the Probit model.  
Secondly, we check for the robustness of our results by also considering another theoretical 
framework, allowing for a third alternative students’ choice, i.e. “Other fields of studies”. In this 
case, we resort to a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, with response probabilities 
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where again  is the choice, assuming now three possible values, i.e. 0, 1 or 2 if the student 
respectively chooses Defending, Productive or Other fields of studies and the other symbols are the 
same as above. The MNL model seems a good candidate to carry out our analysis for several 
reasons: the dependent variable of our regression equation includes multiple non-ordered responses;  
the dataset contains many strictly individual data for which the utilization of MNL is suggested by 
many econometricians (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010); it has been used by other studies on the 
determinants of the fields of studies (Nguyen and Taylor, 2003; Boudarbat, 2008). 
A further robustness check consists in re-estimating the effect of explanatory variables on 
students’ choice by adopting a multilevel rather than a single level model (Hox, 2010; Luke, 2004; 
Goldstein, 2003; Kreft and de DeLeeuw, 1998). Multilevel models are  specifically designed to deal 
with statistical data displaying a clustered construction, like in our case, where individual students 
may be considered lower level units, and administrative regions higher level aggregate units. Since 
it is reasonable to assume that students residing in the same region share some common features and 
are more similar to each other than students living elsewhere, the assumption of independence of 
errors is likely to be violated. By considering group-level variance through the inclusion of random 
coefficients, the multilevel approach allows to control for spatial dependence and correct the 
measurement of standard errors, thereby ensuring efficient estimates2. 
The vector 
 includes a number of different regressors according to the various 
specifications that we consider. Explanatory variables account for different aspects of the choice, 
conveying information on i) students’ individual characteristics, such as gender and parents’ 
education and occupation; ii) students’ secondary education, i.e. High School grade and High 
                                                           
2
 Estimation is made by using STATA and assuming that regression parameters  of equation [1] are region specific, 
i.e.  . Modeling these latter to allow for random regional components ! = "! + #! 	, where i and k are indexes 
respectively for parameters and regions, individual observations $ =  + ∑ ! %!$ !&' + ($  become $ = " +
∑ "!%!$ !&' + # 	 + ∑ #! %!$ !&' + ($ , where on the right hand side the hierarchical structure of the data is 
represented by a deterministic part (the first addends) and a stochastic part (the last addends in brackets).  
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School type; iii) the quality of courses taught at different universities for each field of study; iv) the 
economic condition of students’ province of origin, specifically in terms of per-capita GDP and an 
index of industrial intensity; v) institutional quality of students’ region of origin, considered both in 
terms of the overall value of IQI and the value of single specific IQI dimensions. The employed 
explanatory variables seem to be little exposed to the possibility of reverse causality, since they 
concern either individual features which are determined before the student’s choice or aggregate 
variables which is quite unrealistic to suppose to be affected by students’ options (if not in the very 
long run). Table 1 reports the complete list of dependent and explanatory variables used in the 
econometric investigation.  
Our choice of covariates is common to many other papers on the choice of fields of study. 
Nevertheless, in what follows we motivate the insertion of each explanatory variable. Concerning 
individual characteristics, we first take into account gender, which a very wide literature argues to 
be relevant to the choice of the field of study (for a survey, see for example Xie and Shauman, 2003 
and Goldin, 2006).  It is well known that a remarkable underrepresentation of women is observed in 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) professions (House of Commons, 
2014; European Commission, 2009), scientific academic careers (European Commission, 2009), 
and participation in corporate boards (UK Government, 2011) in many countries, although to a 
different extent (Jacobsen, 2007). The reasons for this phenomenon are several: without denying the 
possibility of differences in preferences between genders, segregation and discrimination are 
certainly important as well. Segregation, i.e. the tendency for men and women to be employed in 
different occupations (Siltanen et al., 1995) due to cultural and sociological reasons, is widely 
recognized by the literature as a persistent worldwide phenomenon (Charles and Grusky, 2004) and 
a source of gender wage differentials. Instead, gender discrimination occurs when wage gaps are not 
completely explained by characteristics related to productivity such as skills, abilities, education, 
experience. According to most of the empirical literature, the discrimination component of the 
gender wage gap, although decreasing over time, is still quite high (about 20%) and tends to decline 
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much slower than the overall differential (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005). In terms of  
choice of field of studies, discriminatory wage differentials may affect women’s options: as 
discrimination is in absolute terms more harmful for more remunerative occupations, it reduces 
women’s reward for technical and scientific careers. Recent literature (Buser et al., 2014) has also 
pointed out that gender differences in educational choices may be explained by a lower tolerance 
for competition (rather than lower abilities) among women, deterring them from entry into more 
challenging and remunerative fields of study.    
Other individual factors affecting students’ educational choices are related to family cultural, 
social and economic conditions (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995; Esping-Andersen 2004; Goodman et 
al., 2015). Since more educated parents tend to encourage choices in favor of more profitable and 
prestigious careers, a limited intergenerational mobility in schooling and educational attainment has 
been observed by many authors (Dustmann, 2004; Corak, 2006; Hertz et al., 2007). Others have 
associated the effect of familiar income and wealth on educational choices to the existence of 
borrowing constraints (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). In our case, 
the absence of data on family income or wealth, induces to include parents’ education and 
occupation among regressors not only as intrinsically relevant variables, but also as proxies of 
familiar economic conditions. However, while the expected effect of family income and wealth on 
the amount of education to acquire is likely to be positive, the impact on the kind of tertiary studies 
is much less obvious. Living in an environment more affluent and more familiar with business (as 
in the case of entrepreneurs) may give more awareness of the importance and gains associated to a 
“defending” occupation. Also, if higher income is associated to less risk aversion, students coming 
from richer families should show higher propensity to pick studies and occupations where ability 
(not thoroughly known ex-ante) and fortune might matter more. So, for example, if becoming a 
successful lawyer is a highly uncertain occurrence, a higher familiar income and a larger 
professional network of parents may help to choose studies in Law.  
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Secondary education type and grade are also considered to account for possible effects of 
students’ background and abilities on the choice of tertiary education. The impact of the type of 
secondary school on the choice of majors is investigated for example by Checchi and Flabbi (2013), 
who focus on the effects of early or late tracking scholastic systems and Boeri et al. (2015) within 
an analysis of the gender wage gap. The importance of high school grades hinges on the idea that 
individuals with higher ability can harvest the largest benefits from investment in tertiary education 
(Averett and Burton, 1996; Hilmer, 1998). In recent papers, Wang (2013) finds a positive 
correlation between high school grade, especially high school math achievement, and the choice for 
a STEM major, while Natkhov and Polishchuk (2013) consider grades obtained at secondary school 
as an explanatory variable for students’ choice of tertiary education because of the possible different 
impact of institutions on the allocation of talent according to students’ abilities.  
The quality of colleges is also considered an important driver of students’ enrollment 
choices (Long, 2004; Luca & Smith, 2013). Especially for those little inclined to move outside the 
region or the area of origin, the relative quality of courses in scientific or legal studies may 
significantly affect the choice for each field of study. To capture this “supply-side” effect, we build 
up a regional Relative Evaluation of the Engineering Faculty (REEF) index. In order to construct 
the regional REEF index, we consider for each region only universities where (at least) one tertiary 
education program in Engineering and one in Law are taught. Then for each university, the 
normalized ratio of ANVUR (Italian National Agency for the Evaluation of University and 
Research) 2004-10 assessments of the Engineering and Law faculties is considered3. Finally, a 
regional average is calculated based on universities’ geographical location. If the quality of faculties 
                                                           
3
 The ratio is made by the numerical evaluations (on a range from 0 to 1) reported at the websites 
http://www.anvur.org/rapporto/files/Area09/VQR2004-2010_Area09_Tabelle.pdf (Table 4.7.a) and 
http://www.anvur.org/rapporto/files/Area12/VQR2004-2010_Area12_Tabelle.pdf (Table 3.1), respectively for 
Engineering and Law faculties. Since throughout the country Engineering gets an average grade of 0,72 and Law 0,50, 
ratios are normalized by dividing by 72/50, so that for Italy REEF=1. 
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matters, we expect that regions with a high relative quality of Engineering (Law) display higher 
shares of students enrolled in Engineering (Law)4. 
The fourth kind of variables we consider accounts for the economic condition of students’ 
province of origin. In particular, we include among regressors per-capita GDP and a provincial 
index of industrial intensity (i.e. the number of industrial employees over population). We expect 
that these variables contain information on structural economic factors possibly interacting with 
careers’ profitability. Indeed, the presence of a developed industrial environment might make more 
profitable for students a choice for Productive studies, by engendering a strong and sustained 
demand for engineers and a workforce endowed with adequate technical skills5. 
Finally, we employ one or more indicators of regional institutional quality as explanatory 
variables for the choice of the field of study. The presence of institutions among regressors is what 
specifically characterizes this paper and its motivations have been expressed in detail in Section 2.  
In addition, Appendix 1 sketches a simple theoretical framework, inspired to the models of Murphy 
et al. (1991) and Acemoglu (1995), aiming at demonstrating how and why institutional quality may 
affect the reward structure of professions, the profitability of Defending occupations and ultimately 
the choice of students. 
 
3.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our investigation is based on a unique dataset provided by ISTAT (Italian National Institute of 
Statistics) which periodically surveys graduates’ employability three or four years after graduation. 
In particular, we use the seventh and the eight wave of the ISTAT survey, reporting information on 
respectively a sample of 47,300 students graduated in 2004 and interviewed in 2007, and a sample 
                                                           
4
 Most of the extant literature finds that the effect of (changes in) university rankings on the number of applications 
received is statistically significant even if quantitatively not large (see for example, Broecke,  2015 on UK; Clarke, 
2007 on USA and Muller and Rockerbie, 2005 about Canada).    
5
 This connection has been documented in particular for the establishment of new large industrial plants. For Southern 
Italy, Cersosimo and Viesti (2013) have recently examined six case studies, showing the existence of a close 
relationship between high tech industrial development and the rise in the number of engineers, physicists and 
technicians graduated at local universities. 
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of 33,696 students graduated in 2007 and interviewed in 20116 (ISTAT, 2009 and 2013). The 
survey includes data on graduates’ individual characteristics (gender, age, residence, family 
background, high school track) and educational choice (field of study and geographic location of 
the university). To supplement this dataset, we also use provincial data for per capita GDP and 
industrial specialization (ISTAT, 2010 and 2011). Finally, we exploit the information on local 
institutional quality in Italian regions contained in the Institutional Quality Index constructed by 
Nifo and Vecchione (2014), and in each of the five indicators constituting IQI, i.e. voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption (in turn 
made up by 24 elementary indexes7). 
Preliminary descriptive statistics on our sample and the population are delivered by Tables  
1 to 4. Table 1 displays the list of the variables with minima, maxima and averages for each 
variable. Table 2 shows the distribution among different fields of study of Italian graduates in 2004 
and 2007. The left panel of Table 2 shows that economics and statistics, engineering, political and 
social studies, medical studies and law are the most popular subjects in university students’ choices, 
accounting together for about 60% of total Italian graduates. Scientific fields (science, chemistry 
and pharmacology, geo-biological studies) are preferred by a little less than 10% of students; arts 
and humanities (architecture, literature, language, psychology and teaching) account for about 
26.6% (2004) or 28.5% (2007) of population, while students getting a degree in agricultural studies, 
physical education or defence and security amount to less than 3.5% of population. The right panel 
of Table 2 rearranges the data, by grouping fields of studies into categories which are more 
consistent with our analytical purposes, aiming at contrasting Productive and Defending (from rent-
seeking) careers. When aggregating fields of study in this fashion, we get the groups of Productive 
                                                           
6
 More precisely, for the eight wave the number of interviewed graduated amounts to 62,000, i.e. about 20.6% of the 
entire population of 300,338 individuals against a share of 18.2% of interviewed for the seventh wave, out of 260,070 
graduates. However, since the eight wave includes variables carrying sensitive personal information, reasons of privacy 
justify the reduction of the available dataset. Nevertheless, the reduced sample is statistically representative. The survey 
is conducted through a detailed questionnaire administered with the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) 
technique.  
7
 Details on elementary indexes and the data sources are given in Table 1 and Appendix 2. 
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(Science, Chemistry and pharmacology, Geo-biological studies, Engineering, Architecture and 
Economics and statistics), Defending (Law and Political and social studies) and Others 
(Agricultural studies, Literature, Language, Teaching, Psychology, Physical education and 
Defence)8. Productive fields of study show a relative majority of graduates (more than 40%); about 
22% of students get a degree in Defending fields of study; 11% in Medical studies and the 
remaining 25% to 27% of graduates are devoted to other studies. 
Tables 3 and 4 reconsider our data by geographic area in order to single out possible 
differences in the distribution among groups of fields of studies. To this purpose, according to the 
usual partition of national territory, Italy is split into four macro-regions, North-West, North-East, 
Centre and South. As anticipated in the introduction, Northern regions show a relative prevalence of 
graduates in scientific, engineering and business fields; conversely, Southern regions display larger 
shares of graduates in legal and socio-political studies, while central regions are in an intermediate 
condition. According to the figures reported in Table 3, the largest differences concern Law (3.63 
percentage points higher in the South than in North-West) and Engineering (1.44 percentage points 
higher in North-East than South). However, in relative terms, i.e. dividing the difference shown in 
Table 3 by the share of Northern graduated in the field of study, the deepest gap is for Science (-
43% in the South with respect to the North-East). It is also worthwhile to notice the peculiar 
distribution of preferences of people graduating abroad: in this case, the shares of Law, Medical 
Studies and Teaching drastically shrink, while the ones of Business, Engineering and especially 
Science and Chemistry are considerably higher than for those graduating at domestic universities. 
Table 4 rearranges data in a way more consistent to the econometric investigation. Medical 
studies, together with missing responses and degrees obtained abroad, are left out; fields of study 
are grouped into Productive, Defending and Others, and distinct figures are provided for each wave 
(i.e., wave VII: graduated in 2004 and wave VIII: graduated in 2007). This makes differences 
                                                           
8
 Notably, Medical studies are not included in either group because of the peculiar restrictions legally imposed on the 
number of students enrolled in this field of study (numerus clausus). For the same reason, Medical studies are also 
excluded by the following econometric investigation. 
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across macro-regions even clearer: the share of students choosing the group of Productive in the 
South is well lower than in other areas (up to 8 percentage points less in 2004, and 7 in 2007) 
whereas graduated in the group of Defending are relatively more numerous (almost 7 percentage 
points more than in the North-East). Differences in the residual group are less sharp; fields of 
studies belonging to this group show a decline over time in all macro-regions.    
 
3.3. Results 
The results of the econometric investigation are summarized in Tables 5 to 8 for binary response 
models (Probit in Tables 5 and 6; Logit in Tables 7 and 8), and Table 9 for Multinomial Logit. 
Tables 10 and 11 report the outcome of multilevel analysis. The interpretation of figures is 
straightforward: since zero value is associated to the preference for a Defending field of study, the 
sign of estimated coefficients (Coeff) corresponds to the sign of the impact of each regressor on the 
probability that the alternative choice (Productive for Tables 5 to 8, 10 and 11; Productive or 
Others for Table 9) is made. Marginal Effects at the Means (MEMs) estimate the quantitative 
magnitude of such impact, i.e. the effect of a unit change in the value of an explanatory variable on 
the probability that the choice alternative to the null one is made.  
In  each table, columns (1) to (5) collect the outcome of regressions run on five different 
specifications. In Tables 5 to 8 both coefficients and marginal effects are shown. In Tables 5, 7, 9 
and 10, the baseline specification, with only familiar and educational background taken into 
account, is described in column (1). The following specification (column 2) includes the indicator 
of education quality. A provincial income indicator is then included in column (3). The final 
specifications comprising institutional quality are described by figures reported in columns (4) and 
(5), respectively without or with the index of industrial intensity. Tables 6, 8 and 11, report the 
results of specifications with all explanatory variables, replacing the overall IQI with one of the five 
indicators constituting it, considered alternatively one at a time: Corruption, Government 
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effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law and Voice and accountability. The last rows of all 
tables report information about sample size and the goodness of fit9. 
Before focusing on the central issue of our exercise, i.e. the effect of institutional quality on 
students’ choice, a preliminary scrutiny of the coefficients of control variables allows us to verify 
whether and how they are actually relevant to the option on the field of study. The coefficients of 
regressors representing individual characteristics of students, i.e. gender and parents’ education and 
occupations always assume negative values and are statistically strongly significant (p values 
always lower than 0.01). This means that female students and those with a better cultural and 
economic familiar background have a higher probability to choose a Defending field of study, 
substantially confirming our a priori expectations. Since all these regressors are dummy variables, a 
significant comparison of the relative size of their effects can be simply made by looking at MEMs. 
This allows to point out that the impact of gender is large (females have a 15% higher probability to 
choose a Defending field of study) and far more important than the other two variables. These 
results are very stable across all different specifications of the Probit model (Tables 5 and 6). When 
using the Logit model (Tables 7 and 8), estimations are again very stable across specifications, and  
differences with Probit are appreciable for coefficients values but negligible for MEMs. Finally, 
looking at Tables 9 to 11 (MNL and multilevel estimates), we notice that the estimates on the effect 
of individual characteristics of students are definitely consistent with results shown in Tables 5 to 8. 
In addition, the right panel of Table 9 highlights that the sign of the coefficient of Gender turns out 
to be positive when the choice alternative to Defending is Other fields of study rather than 
                                                           
9
 For Probit and Logit models (Tables 5-8) the usual statistics are reported, i.e. the value of the likelihood function and 
the pseudo )*. Also, the percent correctly predicted is shown (i.e. the percentage of times that the predicted choice 
matches the actual one). Other measures of the goodness of fit are available upon request. We run tests on multiple 
exclusion of variables related to i) students’ individual characteristics (gender, family education and family network, 
migratory status), ii) students’ secondary education, i.e. High School grade and  High School type; iii) the economic 
condition of students’ province of origin (per-capita GDP and industrial intensity) by using both a Wald and Likelihood 
Ratio test, always rejecting the hypothesis of no effect on students’ choice. Concerning the MNL model, (Table 9) we 
tested the validity of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption (Cheng and Long, 2006; Kropko 
2010) by using a Hausman test, which always yielded negative values. According to Hausman and Mc Fadden (1984), a 
negative value for the Hausman test can be taken as support for the null hypothesis of IIA validity. The Small-Hsiao test 
also confirmed the validity of IIA. The likelihood ratio (LR) test run in Tables 10 and 11 shows the significance of 
regional effects thus confirming the suitability of multilevel modeling.  
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Productive, showing that being a female student involves a sort of hierarchy in preferences:  
Literature, Language, Teaching, Psychology first, then Defending and finally Productive. 
The students’ high school background also seem to exert an important and statistically 
significant effect on the students’ choice. Results in Tables 5 to 8 show that students with grades not 
lower than 90/100 have a probability about 10% higher than others to choose a Productive rather 
Defending field of study. The impact of having a Liceo (science and literature school) rather than a 
technical or vocational secondary school degree on the probability to select a Productive major is 
still positive and significant but much lower. Again, estimates are very stable across different 
specifications and consistent across different estimation models. Like in the case of gender, the 
comparison between Defending and Other fields of studies made in panel 2 of Table 10 shows a 
change in the signs of coefficients for both grade and type of secondary school. This seems to 
indicate that Liceo high-grade students have a consistent order of preferences in the choice of 
university majors: first Productive, then Defending and finally Others. 
Moving to macroeconomic variables, we now look at the impact of local10 per-capita 
income, industrial intensity and institutional quality on students’ preferences for majors11. 
Concerning provincial per capita GDP, coefficient signs come out to be always positive and 
significant, confirming a priori expectations about the positive impact of this regressor on the 
probability of choosing a Productive occupation. MEM values are stable across estimation methods 
but quite variable across specifications. In particular, the quantitative impact of GDP reduces when 
including among regressors IQI alone (specification 4) and especially IQI and industrial intensity 
                                                           
10
 In particular, we prefer to choose provincial (rather regional) per capita income and industrial intensity because we 
believe that the provincial level is the most suitable to represent the specific economic condition of families and 
perceptions on chances of a future occupation in a Productive career. On the other hand, we use regional data on the 
quality of faculties for some provinces do not have universities, and on institutions because it seems likely that expected 
returns to each career be determined by institutional quality at a wider layer than the provincial one. 
11
 The variable representing faculty quality (REEF) is found to be insignificant in most specifications, a relevant 
exception being multilevel estimates shown in Tables 10 and 11. This result may be due to the relatively low propensity 
of Italian students to attend at courses outside the region of residence, in turn due to a poor development of credit to 
education plans. 
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together (specification 5)12. Similar results are delivered by MNL estimation displayed in Table 9: 
in the left panel, income is always positive and significant but once again the value of its coefficient 
drastically shrinks when IQI and IND are considered among explanatory variables13.  
The results of regressions show that the overall institutional quality index IQI has a 
significant effect on the choice of fields of study. For all specifications and any estimation method 
the evidence is that high institutional quality encourages students to select a Productive career 
versus a Defending one (in the case of MNL, even Others fields of study versus Defending). 
However, from inspection of Tables 5, 7, 9 and 10 (i.e. those where IQI is employed), the relative 
importance of institutional quality in shaping students’ option seems to be definitely lower than the 
other macroeconomic variables, as its impact on the probability of choosing Productive can be 
calculated around 9% of the effect of provincial per capita GDP and 7% of industrial intensity 
(specification 5, Tables 5, 7 and 9). 
The impact of institutions is however much higher when the institutional index IQI is 
replaced by its sub-indexes, which in Tables 6 and 8 are employed one by one as regressors. In this 
case, a striking result emerges. Indeed the overall impact of IQI seems to derive by different effects 
of different kinds of institutional factors. So, while some components of IQI do not exert a 
significant impact on the choice of the field of study, we find, in accordance with expectations, that 
REG, VOICE and above all RULE have a strong and significant positive impact on the probability 
of the option Productive. In particular RULE, which is calculated on the basis of number of crimes, 
length of trials, judges’ productivity underground economy and tax evasion, shows MEM around 
4%, i.e. 1.5 times provincial GDP and 0.7 times industrial intensity (see Tables 6 and 8, column 5) . 
This outcome is not surprising, considering that RULE basically represents law enforcement, i.e. 
the main determinants of product appropriability and demand for protection. Thus, law and 
                                                           
12
  A 1% change in provincial per capita GDP involves a change in the probability of choosing a Productive occupation 
between 11.3%, in case IND and IQI are kept out, and 2.6%, when IND and the most important component of IQI, i.e. 
RULE are considered among regressors.   
13
 The estimated effect of per capita GDP is instead unstable in the right panel of Table 9, where the sign surprisingly 
changes moving from specification (3) and (4) to (5).   
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sociopolitical studies draw less interest where institutions are stronger, the demand for legal 
protection and political intermediation is lower and expected rewards for that kind of careers are 
poor. This econometric exercise shows that the weight of institutional quality on the choice of fields 
of study is significant, and particularly substantial when the institutional dimension of law 
enforcement is considered. 
 
4. Concluding remarks  
Students’ choices about post-secondary fields of study vary widely across space and time, due to 
many psychological, social and economic motivations. Regarding these latter, the most important 
role in steering students’ options has been often ascribed to expected returns from different 
occupations. This paper emphasizes in particular the link between local institutional quality, the 
reward structure and students’ preferences. Based on a sample of 80,996 students graduated in Italy 
in 2004 and 2007, our econometric investigation, controlling for both individual characteristics 
(gender, residence, family background, high school track) and geographical variables (per capita 
GDP, industrial specialization), finds that in the choice of the field of study institutional quality 
definitely matters. 
In particular, the overall impact of institutional quality turns out to derive by different effects 
of different kinds of institutional factors. So, while some components of the overall index do not 
exert a significant impact on the choice of the field of study, we find that especially the component 
RULE has a strong and significant positive impact on the probability to enroll in a Science, 
Chemistry, Pharmacology, Geology, Biology, Engineering, Architecture, Economics and Statistics 
tertiary course of study (i.e. in the group we name Productive studies). This outcome is not 
surprising, considering that RULE basically represents law enforcement, i.e. the main determinants 
of product appropriability and demand for protection. Thus, law and sociopolitical studies draw less 
interest where institutions are stronger, the demand for legal protection and political intermediation 
is lower and expected rewards for that kind of careers are poor. 
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Appendix 1 
The following framework is inspired to the model proposed by Acemoglu (1995). Here the number 
of possible occupations is increased to include the group of defending agents, i.e. the ones who 
choose to protect productive agents from rent-seekers who seek to subtract them a share of the 
return from productive activity. 
We assume that the economy consists of a continuum of identical agents normalized to 1. 
Each agent can choose to employ her talent in one of the three possible activities: productive, rent-
seeking and defending. If involved in the first kind of activity, the agent gains a net return equal to 
   +, = [1 − /0]2 + 3 − /45 − 63              [A1] 
where / and 5 are the shares of rent seekers and defending over the total number of agents; 0 is the 
share of resources at stake (i.e. the proportion of production which rent-seekers can seize); 4 is the 
wage of defending, assumed to be decreasing in 5 (i.e. 47 < 0) because of competition among 
defending agents, with finite 40; 3 is investment, 2 + 3 its gross revenue and 6 the production 
cost, increasing and convex in 3, i.e. 67 > 0;	677 > 0.  
Without rent-seekers (i.e. / = 0), the productive agent would get a net revenue 2 + 3 − 6); 
the expected cost from rent-seeking is the sum of gross revenue at risk of expropriation and the 
wage to pay to defender for protection 02 + 3 + 4, times the probability / that the producer has 
to deal with a rent-seeker.  
The producer determines how much to invest in order to maximize [A1], i.e. the optimal 
amount of investment such that  67 3 = ;1 − /0<, which implies that optimal investment  3/, 0 
be everywhere decreasing in / and 0. 
The net return to being a defending agent is 
    += = /1 − / − 545                          [A2] 
i.e. her unit wage times the probability of being employed, which in turn depends on the shares of 
rent-seekers / and producers 1 − / − 5. 
Finally, the expected return to a rent seeker is 
    +> = 1 − / − 5/, 0                          [A3] 
i.e. the payoff to rent seekers equals the likelihood of obtaining bribes which in turn is positively 
connected to the probability of dealing with producers 1 − / − 5 times the unit reward /, 0, 
assumed to be decreasing in / because of competition among rent seekers, and increasing in the 
share of resources at stake, i.e. ?7 < 0;	@7 > 0. 
For a given level of 0, equilibra with agents choosing all kinds of occupation are 
characterized by couples /, 5 solving [A1] - [A3], plus the condition of equal expected return to 
any occupation, i.e. 
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     +, = += = +> = +.                [A4] 
A possible equilibrium is the one described in Figure 1, where returns to productive, 
defending and rent-seeking agents are depicted as a function of 5 and /. To draw Figure 1, we 
substitute for optimal investment in 3/, 0 in [A1] and calculate: 
A+,
A/
= −[2 + 3/, 0]0 − 45 < 0; 
A*+,
A/*
= −3?7 /, 00 > 0; 
A+=
A/
= 1 − 2/ − 545 > 0 
and 
A+>
A/
= −/, 0 + 1 − / − 5?7/, 0 < 0. 
Assuming that / ≤ 'D
*
, i.e. the productive agents are not less numerous than rent-seekers, 
so that EF
G
E?
 is positive, we can draw the graph of panel (a). A simple argument shows that in this 
case intersection at point H is a stable equilibrium: in fact, for / > /∗, += > +, > +>, so that rent 
seeking is comparatively less profitable than the alternative occupations; thus, / decreases. 
Conversely, if  / < /∗, an interval of values of / exists for which +> > +, > +=; therefore rent 
seeking is the most profitable activity and / goes up. Notice that in Figure 1 it is also assumed, like 
in Acemoglu (1995) that [2 + 30, 0] − 6[30, 0] > 0, 0. This implies that for / small 
enough, +, exceeds returns to any alternative career and an all-producers equilibrium takes place. 
To draw the graph of panel (b), we calculate  
A+,
A5
= −/47 5 > 0; 
A+=
A5
= −/45 + /1 − / − 5475 < 0 
and 
A+>
A5
= −/, 0 < 0 
and assume that /1 − /40 > 1 − //, 0 > [1 − /0]2 + 3 − /40 − 63 > 0. In this 
case, the unique intersection at point H7 is a stable equilibrium: for 5 < 5∗, being a defending agent 
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is the most profitable choice and 5 goes up; for 5 > 5∗, the return to lawyers is less than the others; 
people are discouraged to choose that career and 5 decreases. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effects of an exogenous change in 0 starting from the equilibrium of 
Figure 1. As argued in the main text, institutional quality and the amount of production at stake, i.e. 
the share of resources that rent-seekers can seize, are closely (inversely) related. So, an 
improvement of institutional quality may be represented as a reduction of 0, yielding: 
A+,
A0
= −/[2 + 3/, 0] < 0; 
A+>
A0
= 1 − / − 5@7 > 0. 
Graphically, the effects of decreasing 0 are illustrated by shifts in +> (downward, because 
rent seekers get less from each bribe) and +, (upward, because producers lose less). As a result, a 
new stable equilibrium in JJ7	is reached with lower shares of rent seekers and defending agents 
and a higher share of productive agents. Notice that even if += does not depend on 0, in response to 
an improvement in institutional quality, it shifts	as	well	toward the new equilibrium JJ7, because 
of changes occurring in 5 and in / (precisely upward in panel (a) and downward in panel (b)). 
However, for the sake of clarity, these modifications are not shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Appendix 2  
Data sources. 
For variables 1-8 of Table 1, sources are ISTAT (2009) and (2013); for variable 9, ANVUR (2013); 
for variable 10, ISTAT (2011); for variable 11, Istituto Tagliacarne (2004); for variables 12-17, 
Nifo and Vecchione (2014). Concerning in particular variables 13-17, CORR is composed by 
elementary indicators on: crimes against PA (ratio crimes against the public administration over 
number of public servants; ISTAT, 2004); the Golden-Picci corruption index (Golden and Picci, 
2005); special commissioners (number of overruled municipalities on total municipalities; 
Ministero dell’Interno, 2006). GOV is made up of: endowment of social facilities (education, 
healthcare and leisure facilities; Istituto Tagliacarne, 2001); endowment of economic facilities 
(roads, railroads, ports, airports, energy, ICT, banking; Istituto Tagliacarne, 2004); public health 
care budget deficit (per capita 1997-2004; elaboration on Ministero dell’Economia, 2004); waste 
sorting (share of waste sorting on total waste; Istituto Tagliacarne, 2004); urban environment index 
(including 25 indexes on: air quality, water quality, purification plants, waste management, public 
transportation, energy consumption, public parks, eco-management, etc. Legambiente, 2004). REG 
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comprises elementary indexes on economy openness (ratio import plus export on local GDP; 
Istituto Tagliacarne, 2004); employed by local governments (number of public servants over 
resident population; ISTAT, 2003); business density (number of firms for 100 residents; Istituto 
Tagliacarne, 2004); business start-ups/mortality (registration/mortality rate; Istituto Tagliacarne, 
2004); business environment (including 39 indexes on: entrepreneurship, job market, tax system, 
market competition, banking, bureaucracy, public services to firms,  firms’ cooperation; 
Confartigianato, 2009). RULE is composed by the number of crimes against property (ratio crimes 
against property over resident population; ISTAT, 2003) and total reported crimes (ratio number of 
reported crimes over resident population; ISTAT, 2003); length of trials (average length of judicial 
process; CRENOS, 2001); judges’ productivity (number of completed trials for magistrate in 
regional courts; Ministero della Giustizia, 2009); underground economy (ISTAT, 2003); tax evasion 
(Agenzia delle entrate, 2006). VOICE is made up of: social cooperatives (per 100,000 residents; 
ISTAT, 2005); associations (per 100,000 residents; ISTAT, 2006); election turn-out (general 
election in 2001; Ministero dell’Interno, 2013); number of published books (in absolute value; 
ISTAT, 2007); purchases of books (number of purchased books over resident population; Il 
Sole24Ore, 2004). 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Dependent and explanatory variables of the econometric investigation. 
Variable 
Description Average Min Max 
n
. 
name 
Dependent variables     
1. y_1  (Probit and Logit) 
Dichotomous dummy. 
0=Law; 1=Science. 0.704 0 1 
2. y_2 (MNL) Trichotomous dummy. 0=Law; 1=Science; 2=Other fields of study. 1.526 0 2 
Individual characteristics 
     
3. Gender Dichotomous dummy. 0=Male; 1=Female. 0.541 0 1 
4. Par_Edu Dichotomous dummy. 0=Neither parent graduated ;1= One or both parents graduated.  0.252 0 1 
5. Par_occ 
Dichotomous dummy. 0=Neither parent is a professional or 
entrepreneur; 1=One or both parents are professionals or 
entrepreneurs.  
0.401 0 1 
Secondary education      
6. HS_grade 
Dichotomous dummy. 0=final Grade Point Average at High 
School < 90/100; 1=final Grade Point Average at High 
School ≥ 90/100 
0.411 0 1 
7. HS_type Dichotomous dummy. 0= other High Schools; 1= “Liceo” High Schools. 0.580 0 1 
Tertiary education 
  
   
8.  REEF Relative evaluation of Engineering Faculty. Regional average.  1.024 0.211 2.022 
Economic condition 
  
   
9. GDP Provincial per capita GDP. Yearly averages 2001-2004,  
current value Euros. 19,149 9,947 32,370 
10. IND Provincial ratio industrial employees over population  0.091 0.043 0.308 
Institutional quality      
11. IQI Regional institutions index 0.572 0.141 0.900 
12. CORR Regional (inverse) corruption index, log 0.448 0.305 0.969 
13. GOV Regional policy effectiveness index  0.245 0.082 0.514 
14. REG Regional regulatory quality index 0.386 0.199 0.850 
15. RULE Regional rule of law index 0.643 0.192 0.863 
16. VOICE Regional civil society index 0.336 0.173 0.695 
Data sources: See Appendix 2  
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Table 2. Graduates for field of study and group in Italy, number and % share. 
Field of study 2004 % 2007 % Group 2004 % 2007 % 
Science 6555 2.52 7800 2.60 
Productive 108735 41.81 120651 40.17 
Chemistry and 
pharmacology 6834 2.63 6863 2.29 
Geo-Biological  10904 4.19 13787 4.59 
Engineering 32328 12.43 35766 11.91 
Architecture 11708 4.50 15065 5.02 
Economics and 
statistics 40406 15.54 41370 13.77 
Law 28406 10.92 25604 8.53 
Defending 57193 21.99 65724 21.88 
Political-Social 28787 11.07 40120 13.36 
Agriculture 5416 2.08 5662 1.89 
Others 65939 25.35 80909 26.94 
Literature 21811 8.39 25728 8.57 
Language 12699 4.88 15770 5.25 
Teaching  12745 4.90 15681 5.22 
Psychology 10119 3.89 13416 4.47 
Physical education 2762 1.06 3797 1.26 
Defence-Security 387 0.15 855 0.28 
Medical studies 28203 10.84 33054 11.01 Medical 
studies 28203 10.84 33054 11.01 
Total 260070 100.00 300338 100.00 Total 260070 100.00 300338 100.00 
Data source: ISTAT (2009, 2013) 
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Table 3. Graduates for field of study and macro-region in Italy, number and % share. 
Field of study NW NE Centre South Abroad NR NW NE Centre South Abroad NR 
 
Number % share 
Science 707 630 493 551 55 25 3.37 3.96 2.78 2.24 5.40 3.65 
Chemistry and 
pharmacology 746 534 503 799 61 25 3.55 3.35 2.83 3.24 5.99 3.65 
Geo-Biological  850 530 687 1028 54 23 4.05 3.33 3.87 4.17 5.30 3.36 
Engineering 2521 1919 1993 2565 155 67 12.01 12.05 11.23 10.41 15.21 9.80 
Architecture 1317 910 745 1050 64 36 6.28 5.71 4.20 4.26 6.28 5.26 
Economics and 
statistics 2928 2177 2371 3144 158 115 13.95 13.67 13.36 12.76 15.51 16.81 
Law 1560 1218 1390 2724 44 36 7.43 7.65 7.83 11.06 4.32 5.26 
Political-Social 1641 1122 1566 2127 114 94 7.82 7.04 8.82 8.64 11.19 13.74 
Agriculture 367 393 340 584 35 9 1.75 2.47 1.92 2.37 3.43 1.32 
Literature 834 727 871 1114 65 37 3.97 4.56 4.91 4.52 6.38 5.41 
Language 665 542 484 632 96 72 3.17 3.40 2.73 2.57 9.42 10.53 
Teaching 648 663 471 842 15 19 3.09 4.16 2.65 3.42 1.47 2.78 
Psychology 487 378 407 541 15 21 2.32 2.37 2.29 2.20 1.47 3.07 
Physical education 759 438 415 709 5 4 3.62 2.75 2.34 2.88 0.49 0.58 
Medical studies 4903 3696 4942 6117 82 100 23.36 23.20 27.85 24.83 8.05 14.62 
No Response 52 52 70 104 1 1 0.25 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.10 0.15 
Total 20985 15929 17748 24631 1019 684 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Data source: ISTAT (2009, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Shares of graduates for group, macro-region and wave 
Wave I Wave, graduated in 2004    II Wave, graduated in 2007 
Group North-W North-E Centre South         North-W North-E Centre South 
Productive 55.73 52.87 51.67 47.73    57.62 57.96 55.17 50.93 
Defending 19.51 18.62 22.34 25.46    20.63 19.98 24.25 26.92 
Others 24.76 28.52 25.99 26.81    21.76 22.06 20.59 22.15 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00    100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Data source: ISTAT (2009, 2013) 
 
  
  
 
Table 5. Probit Model. Estimated coefficients and marginal effects (0: Defending; 1: Productive) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM 
           
Gender -0.472*** -0.158*** -0.464*** -0.156*** -0.459*** -0.154*** -0.459*** -0.153*** -0.461*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0129) (0.00414) (0.0133) (0.00429) (0.0133) (0.00431) (0.0133) (0.00432) (0.0134) (0.00431) 
           
Par_Edu -0.0952*** -0.0320*** -0.0903*** -0.0303*** -0.0866*** -0.0291*** -0.0867*** -0.0297*** -0.0868*** -0.0295*** 
 (0.0171) (0.00572) (0.0177) (0.00591) (0.0176) (0.00592) (0.0177) (0.00592) (0.0177) (0.00591) 
           
Par_Occ -0.0559*** -0.0188*** -0.0593*** -0.0199*** -0.0719*** -0.0241*** -0.0725*** -0.0243*** -0.0685*** -0.0229*** 
 (0.0149) (0.00500) (0.0154) (0.00516) (0.0154) (0.00518) (0.0154) (0.00517) (0.0154) (0.00517) 
           
HS_grade 0.2818*** 0.0946*** 0.294*** 0.0989*** 0.297*** 0.0996*** 0.298*** 0.1001*** 0.299*** 0.01001*** 
 (0.0131) (0.00432) (0.0136) (0.00447) (0.0136) (0.00448) (0.0135) (0.00447) (0.0136) (0.00447) 
           
HS_type 0.0307** 0.0103** 0.0327** 0.0111** 0.0343** 0.0115** 0.0347** 0.0114** 0.0404*** 0.0135*** 
 (0.0136) (0.00457) (0.0141) (0.00473) (0.0144) (0.00474) (0.0141) (0.00473) (0.0142) (0.00474) 
           
lg_REEF   -0.0409 -0.0137 0.0252 0.00846 0.0197 0.0066 0.0219 0.00883 
   (0.0273) (0.00912) (0.0278) (0.00934) (0.0278) (0.00933) (0.0279) (0.00934) 
           
lg_GDP     0.339*** 0.113*** 0.282*** 0.0945*** 0.1331*** 0.0444*** 
     (0.0241) (0.00805) (0.0256) (0.0085) (0.0314) (0.0139) 
           
lg_IND         0.1805*** 0.0603*** 
         (0.0231) (0.0073) 
           
lg_IQI       0.0131*** 0.0044*** 0.0123*** 0.0041*** 
       (0.0244) (0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0006) 
           
Constant 0.672***  0.661***  -2.685***  -2.108  0.2083  
 (0.0133)  (0.0137)  (0.242)  (0.417)  (0.457)  
N 44222 41410 41087 41087 41087 
Pseudo-R2 0.0312 0.0310 0.0346 0.0364 0.0371 
Log likelihood -26141.974 -24528.25 -24256.68 -24211.632 -24194.233 
Correctly predicted 70.08% 69.95% 69.84% 69.94% 69.91% 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
  
Table 6. Probit Model. Estimated coefficients and marginal effects (0: Defending; 1: Productive) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM 
           
Gender -0.461*** -0.154*** -0.461*** -0.154*** -0.461*** -0.154*** -0.462*** -0.154*** -0.461*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0135) (0.00432) (0.0135) (0.00431) (0.0134) (0.00432) (0.0135) (0.00431) (0.0135) (0.00432) 
           
Par_Edu -0.0867*** -0.0291*** -0.0865*** -0.0289*** -0.0866*** -0.0289*** -0.0887*** -0.0296*** -0.0865*** -0.0289*** 
 (0.0178) (0.00592) (0.0178) (0.00592) (0.0177) (0.00592) (0.0178) (0.00592) (0.0178) (0.00592) 
           
Par_Occ -0.0671*** -0.0226*** -0.0672*** -0.0227*** -0.0676*** -0.0226*** -0.0661*** -0.0221*** -0.0677*** -0.0226*** 
 (0.0156) (0.00517) (0.0156) (0.00517) (0.0154) (0.00517) (0.0156) (0.00517) (0.0156) (0.00517) 
           
HS_grade 0.297*** 0.0995*** 0.297*** 0.0996*** 0.297*** 0.0996*** 0.297*** 0.0996*** 0.297*** 0.0995*** 
 (0.0137) (0.00447) (0.0137) (0.00447) (0.0135) (0.00447) (0.0137) (0.00447) (0.0137) (0.00447) 
           
HS_type 0.0403*** 0.0135*** 0.0404*** 0.0135*** 0.0403*** 0.0135*** 0.0395*** 0.0132*** 0.0401*** 0.0134*** 
 (0.0142) (0.00474) (0.0142) (0.00474) (0.0142) (0.00474) (0.0142) (0.00474) (0.0142) (0.00474) 
           
lg_REEF 0.0278 0.00932 0.0244 0.00817 0.0266 0.00891 0.00834 0.000279 0.0265 0.00887 
 (0.0282) (0.00937) (0.0282) (0.00941) (0.0279) (0.00935) (0.0282) (0.00939) (0.0279) (0.00935) 
           
lg_GDP 0.179*** 0.0601*** 0.185*** 0.0624*** 0.174*** 0.0584*** 0.0806** 0.0269** 0.161*** 0.0542*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0103) (0.0311) (0.0103) (0.0307) (0.0102) (0.0345) (0.0114) (0.0323) (0.0108) 
           
lg_IND 0.186*** 0.0624*** 0.189*** 0.0633*** 0.181*** 0.0603*** 0.169*** 0.0567*** 0.189*** 0.0632*** 
 (0.0222) (0.00743) (0.0223) (0.00743) (0.0226) (0.00752) (0.0224) (0.00744) (0.0223) (0.00741) 
           
lg_CORR 0.00061 0.000205         
 (0.00180) (0.000601)         
           
lg_GOV   -0.00364 -0.00122       
   (0.00402) (0.00134)       
           
lg_REG     0.00573* 0.00192*     
     (0.0034) (0.00116)     
           
lg_RULE       0.121*** 0.0401***   
       (0.0185) (0.00619)   
           
lg_VOICE         0.0103* 0.00347* 
         (0.00592) (0.00198) 
           
Constant -0.2338  -0.2835  -0.209  0.715*  -0.038  
 (0.375)  (0.375)  (0.378)  (0.402)  (0.392)  
N 41087 41087 41087 41073 41087 
Pseudo-R2 0.0360 0.0360 0.0361 0.0369 0.0361 
Log likelihood -24220.95 -24220.592 -24219.666 -24192.404 -24219.482 
Correctly predicted 69.83% 69.82% 69.84% 69.87% 69.83% 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
  
Table 7. Logit Model. Estimated coefficients and marginal effects (0: Defending; 1: Productive) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM 
           
Gender -0.782*** -0.157*** -0.769*** -0.155*** -0.761*** -0.153*** -0.761*** -0.153*** -0.763*** -0.153*** 
 (0.0216) (0.00413) (0.0224) (0.00428) (0.0223) (0.00429) (0.0225) (0.00429) (0.0225) (0.00429) 
           
Par_Edu -0.155*** -0.0314*** -0.147*** -0.0298*** -0.142*** -0.0286*** -0.145*** -0.0286*** -0.142*** - 0.0286*** 
 (0.0283) (0.00571) (0.0294) (0.00591) (0.0295) (0.00591) (0.0296) (0.00591) (0.0296) (0.00591) 
           
Par_Occ -0.0930*** -0.0187*** -0.0986*** -0.0199*** -0.119*** -0.0241*** -0.121*** -0.0226*** -0.114*** -0.0229*** 
 (0.0248) (0.00499) (0.0257) (0.00515) (0.0259) (0.00517) (0.0257) (0.00517) (0.0259) (0.00517) 
           
HS_grade 0.466*** 0.0940*** 0.486*** 0.0983*** 0.491*** 0.0989*** 0.494*** 0.0994*** 0.495*** 0.0994*** 
 (0.0219) (0.00433) (0.0227) (0.00448) (0.0229) (0.00449) (0.0227) (0.00449) (0.0229) (0.00449) 
           
HS_type 0.0578** 0.0116** 0.0615*** 0.0124*** 0.0641*** 0.0129*** 0.0646*** 0.0131*** 0.0747*** 0.0151*** 
 (0.0227) (0.00457) (0.0235) (0.00473) (0.0236) (0.00474) (0.0235) (0.00473) (0.0237) (0.00474) 
           
lg_REEF   -0.0642 -0.0129 0.0408 0.0096 0.0386 0.0077 0.0409 0.0082 
   (0.0454) (0.00915) (0.0468) (0.00938) (0.0466) (0.0093) (0.0470) (0.00941) 
           
lg_GDP     0.563*** 0.113*** 0.4689*** 0.0943*** 0.2199*** 0.0442*** 
     (0.0407) (0.00805) (0.0427) (0.0085) (0.0523) (0.0105) 
           
lg_IND         0.2991*** 0.0601*** 
         (0.0371) (0.0074) 
           
lg_IQI       0.0213*** 0.0042*** 0.0201*** 0.0045*** 
       (0.0032) (0.0006) (0.0418) (0.0006) 
           
Constant 1.094***  1.074***  -4.474***  -3.526***  0.3308***  
 (0.0223)  (0.0237)  (0.402)  (0.423)  (0.766)  
N 44222 41410 41087 41087 41087 
Pseudo-R2 0.0310 0.0308 0.0344 0.0362 0.0369 
Log likelihood -26146.031 -24532.085 -24261.429 -24216.804 -24199.847 
Correctly predicted 70.08% 69.95% 69.86% 69.94% 69.96% 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
  
Table 8. Logit Model. Estimated coefficients and marginal effects (0: Defending; 1: Productive) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM Coeff MEM 
           
Gender -0.763*** -0.153*** -0.763*** -0.153*** -0.764*** -0.153*** -0.762*** -0.153*** -0.763*** -0.153*** 
 (0.0225) (0.00429) (0.0225) (0.00429) (0.0225) (0.00429) (0.0225) (0.00429) (0.0225) (0.00429) 
           
Par_Edu -0.142*** -0.0286*** -0.142*** -0.0285*** -0.142*** -0.0285*** -0.145*** -0.0295*** -0.142*** -0.0285*** 
 (0.0296) (0.00591) (0.0294) (0.00591) (0.0296) (0.00591) (0.0296) (0.00591) (0.0296) (0.00591) 
           
Par_Occ -0.113*** -0.0227*** -0.113*** -0.0227*** -0.112*** -0.0227*** -0.111*** -0.0222*** -0.112*** -0.0227*** 
 (0.0259) (0.00517) (0.0259) (0.00517) (0.0259) (0.00517) (0.0259) (0.00517) (0.0259) (0.00517) 
           
HS_grade 0.492*** 0.0989*** 0.492*** 0.0991*** 0.492*** 0.0991*** 0.492*** 0.0991*** 0.492*** 0.0991*** 
 (0.0229) (0.00449) (0.0229) (0.00449) (0.0229) (0.00449) (0.0229) (0.00449) (0.0229) (0.00449) 
           
HS_type 0.0746*** 0.0151*** 0.0746*** 0.0150*** 0.0745*** 0.0151*** 0.0731*** 0.0146*** 0.0741*** 0.0149*** 
 (0.0237) (0.00474) (0.0237) (0.00474) (0.0237) (0.00474) (0.0237) (0.00474) (0.0237) (0.00476) 
           
lg_REEF 0.0511 0.00102 0.0455 0.00916 0.0491 0.00985 0.0174 0.00349 0.0488 0.00981 
 (0.0472) (0.00944) (0.0473) (0.00946) (0.0470) (0.00941) (0.0473) (0.00945) (0.0470) (0.00941) 
           
lg_GDP 0.296*** 0.0596*** 0.305*** 0.0614*** 0.288*** 0.0581*** 0.1313** 0.0263** 0.268*** 0.0539*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0103) (0.0518) (0.0103) (0.0517) (0.0102) (0.0574) (0.0114) (0.0542) (0.0108) 
           
lg_IND 0.308*** 0.0621*** 0.313*** 0.0629*** 0.298*** 0.0601*** 0.281*** 0.0565*** 0.312*** 0.0629*** 
 (0.0374) (0.00746) (0.0375) (0.00748) (0.0379) (0.00757) (0.0375) (0.00752) (0.0373) (0.00744) 
           
lg_CORR 0.001073 0.00021         
 (0.00295) (0.000592)         
           
lg_GOV   -0.00551 -0.00111       
   (0.0065) (0.00132)       
           
lg_REG     0.0092* 0.00185*     
     (0.00570) (0.00114)     
           
lg_RULE       0.197*** 0.0397***   
       (0.0306) (0.00610)   
           
lg_VOICE         0.0166* 0.00334* 
         (0.00950) (0.00191) 
           
Constant -0.396  -0.473  -0.359  1.191*  -0.083  
 (0.625)  (0.632)  (0.630)  (0.676)  (0.658)  
N 41087 41087 41087 41073 41087 
Pseudo-R2 0.0358 0.0358 0.0359 0.0366 0.0359 
Log likelihood -24226.686 -24226.399 -24225.459 -24198.004 -24225.24 
Correctly predicted 69.80% 69.81% 69.81% 69.87% 69.82% 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
Table 9. Multinomial Logit Model. Estimated coefficients (0: Defending). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1: Productive       2: Others      
             
Gender -0.780*** -0.767*** -0.761*** -0.761*** -0.763***  Gender 0.266*** 0.286*** 0.283*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0224)   (0.0250) (0.0261) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0264) 
             
Par_Edu -0.141*** -0.141*** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.137***  Par_Edu -0.130*** -0.126*** -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.118*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0288) (0.0291) (0.0292) (0.0292)   (0.0329) (0.0344) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) 
             
Par_Occ -0.0931*** -0.0963*** -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.113***  Par_Occ -0.160*** -0.165*** -0.194*** -0.195*** -0.189*** 
 (0.0243) (0.0252) (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0256)   (0.0282) (0.0294) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298) 
             
HS_grade 0.471*** 0.486*** 0.491*** 0.493*** 0.494***  HS_grade -0.317*** -0.325*** -0.327*** -0.324*** -0.323*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0227)   (0.0255) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) 
             
HS_type 0.0415* 0.0454** 0.0474** 0.0481** 0.0566**  HS_type -0.340*** -0.349*** -0.343*** -0.342*** -0.333*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0234)   (0.0253) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0267) 
             
lg_REEF  -0.0607 0.0611 0.0510 0.0564  lg_REEF  -0.0365 0.0655 0.0551 0.0587 
  (0.0453) (0.0470) (0.0472) (0.0472)    (0.0520) (0.0538) (0.0538) (0.0540) 
             
lg_GDP   0.560*** 0.4645*** 0.2183***  lg_GDP   0.428*** 0.322*** -0.6401*** 
   (0.0401) (0.0506) (0.0522)     (0.0465) (0.0492) (0.0611) 
             
lg_IND     0.2943***  lg_IND     0.3067*** 
     (0.0371)       (0.0432) 
             
lg_IQI    0.0215*** 0.0203***  lg_IQI    0.0246*** 0.0234*** 
    (0.0032) (0.0032)      (0.0040) (0.0041) 
             
Constant 1.100*** 1.080*** -4.437*** -3.474*** 0.333  Constant 0.298*** 0.268*** -3.941*** 0.261 1.111 
 (0.0223) (0.0231) (0.396) (0.421) (0.761)   (0.0258) (0.0269) (0.459) (0.729) (0.892) 
N 59787 55087 53998 53998 53998  N 59787 55087 53998 53998 53998 
Pseudo R2 0.0374 0.0379 0.0396 0.0401 0.0409  Pseudo R2 0.0374 0.0379 0.0396 0.0401 0.0409 
Log likelihood -58433.22 -53818.99 -52658.54 -52630.42 -52584.47  Log likelihood -58433.22 -53818.99 -52658.54 -52630.42 -52584.47 
LR chi2 4538.49 4237.21 4338.04 4415.41 4486.17  LR chi2 4538.49 4237.21 4338.04 4415.41 4486.17 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 10. Multilevel Model. Estimated coefficients (0: Defending; 1: Productive) 
 (1)       (2)              (3) (4) 
     
Gender -0.469*** -0.462*** -0.461*** -0.460*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
     
Par_Edu -0.0888*** -0.0861*** -0.0857*** -0.0843*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
     
Par_Occ -0.0676*** -0.0670*** -0.0694*** -0.0706*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
     
HS_grade 0.295*** 0.306*** 0.300*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
     
HS_type 0.0357*** 0.0379*** 0.0380*** 0.0388*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0142) 
     
lg_REEF  0.114*** 0.0300 0.0328 
  (0.0321) (0.0301) (0.0344) 
     
lg_GDP   0.222*** 0.2173*** 
   (0.0250) (0.0329) 
     
lg_IQI    0.0091*** 
    (0.0225) 
     
Constant 0.691*** 0.676*** -1.508*** -1.458*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0141) (0.248) (0.251) 
N 44222 41410 41087 41087 
Log likelihood -25933.822 -24361.691 -24201.759 -24200.386 
LR test 416.30 333.12 109.84 68.99 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. If lg_IND is 
included among regressors, estimation does not converge.   
  
Table 11. Multilevel Model. Estimated coefficients. (0: Defending; 1: Productive) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Gender -0.462*** -0.462*** -0.462*** -0.461*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
     
Par_Edu -0.0866*** -0.0846*** -0.0850*** -0.0871*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
     
Par_Occ -0.0672*** -0.0666*** -0.0667*** -0.0664*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
     
HS_grade 0.301*** 0.302*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
     
HS_type 0.0395*** 0.0396*** 0.0395*** 0.0392*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) 
     
lg_REEF 0.181*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.139*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0321) (0.0330) (0.0426) 
     
lg_GDP 0.104*** 0.149*** 0.138*** 0.0614** 
 (0.0311) (0.0304) (0.0295) (0.0253) 
     
lg_IND 0.0994*** 0.154*** 0.146*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0288) 
     
lg_CORR 0.00377**    
 (0.00183)    
     
lg_GOV  -0.00898**   
  (0.00410)   
     
lg_REG   0.00369  
   (0.00351)  
     
lg_RULE    0.0895*** 
    (0.0217) 
     
Constant 0.100 -0.0701 0.0156 0.616** 
 (0.371) (0.365) (0.352) (0.301) 
N 41087 41087 41087 41073 
Log likelihood -24182.954 -24186.639 -24188.518 -24175.382 
LR test 75.99 67.91 62.29 34.04 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. If lg_VOICE is included among 
regressors, estimation does not converge.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  Figure 1. Returns to agents and the shares of rent seekers and defending. 
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   Figure 2. The effects of improving institutional quality (lower 
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